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LIST OF PARTIES-NAMES OF PARTIES 
The parties are listed and fully named in the caption 
and a list of the parties is therefore not necessary. 
Hereinafter, Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, will be 
referred to as Forsgren-Perkins, and Mother Earth Industries, 
Inc., will be referred to as Mother Earth. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC. 
a Delaware Corporation, and 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Respondents. 
APPEAL NO. 89-0099 
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court 
Beaver County, State of Utah 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a civil 
contract and mechanics lien action, in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Beaver County, the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves, Judge, presiding. The appeal was initially taken to 
the Utah Supreme Court. The appeal was then transferred to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) 
and 78-2A-3(2)(J) (1953 as amended). 
A STATEMENT OF THE CASE, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND ITS DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
This was an action filed by Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, hereinafter "Forsgren-Perkins11, 
to foreclose upon a mechanics lien filed in Beaver County, 
Utah. The Defendant-Respondent, Mother Earth Industries, 
Inc., hereinafter Mother Earth, moved to dismiss the claim 
for the reason that such claim had already been asserted by 
Forsgren-Perkins as a compulsory counter-claim in the Third 
Judicial District Court. The Fifth Judicial District Court 
dismissed the Complaint, Forsgren-Perkins made two attempts 
to get the Fifth Judicial District Court to reconsider its 
decision and Order of Dismissal and then after failing the 
second time, appealed from the Order of Dismissal. 
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether a defaulting party, which has failed to 
respond to a Motion to Dismiss as required by Rule 2.8 of the 
Rules of Practice of the District Courts, can ask the court 
to reconsider its decision and order of dismissal. 
2. Whether a motion for reconsideration, no matter 
what it is entitled, is permitted under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
3. Whether an objection to an Order of the Court that 
2 
is based solely upon an objection to the underlying decision 
rendered by the Court and not to the language of the Order, 
can be utilized as a vehicle by the losing party to obtain a 
reconsideration of the underlying order. 
4. Whether a technical error committed by a District 
Court which consisted of executing and entering an Order on 
the fifth day of the five day waiting period inferred by Rule 
2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts can be 
grounds for: 
a. A reversal of the underlying order which 
itself may not be subject to reversal. 
b. An extension of the time for appeal of 
the underlying order. 
c. An excuse that counsel for the losing 
party was unaware the order had been entered. 
d. A reversal of the underlying Order which 
itself is not subject to reversal. 
5. Whether the Notice of Appeal which was filed by 
Forsgren-Perkins more than 30 days after the entry of the 
judgment was untimely and the appeal should be dismissed 
because either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
6. Whether a motion for reconsideration of an order of 
3 
dismissal can extend the 30 day period for the filing of an 
appeal to either the Utah Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following determinative statutes and Rules of 
Procedure, and Rules of Practice apply to this appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-13-1. Set forth below. 
2. Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
3. Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. Rule 2.8 Rules of Practice-District and Circuit 
Courts. 
7. Rule 2.9 Rules of Practice-District and Circuit 
Courts. 
VERBATIM RECITATION OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-13-1. Actions 
respecting real property. 
Actions for the following causes must be tried 
in the county in which the subject of the action, 
or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the 
power of the court to change the place of trial as 
provided in this code: 
. . . . 
(3) For the foreclosure of all 
liens and mortgages on real property. 
Where the real property is situated partly in 
4 
one county and partly in another, the plaintiff may 
select either of the counties, and the county so 
selected is the proper county for the trial of such 
action. 
VERBATIM RECITATION OF RULE 2.9. 
Rule 2.9. Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees. 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for 
the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as 
the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, 
Judgments, and/or Orders shall be served on 
opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days 
after service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals 
shall be reduced to writing and presented to the 
court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the 
settlement and dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Forsgren-Perkins performed various engineering 
services consisting of BLM permitting, concept design, 
engineering design, preparation of plans and specifications, 
bidding, supervision of construction, etc. for the 
construction of a geothermal electrical power producing 
facility located near Cove Fort/Sulphurdale Utah. (See 
Complaint of Forsgren-Perkins, R. 1, and Complaint of Mother 
Earth attached to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change 
5 
of Venue or in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.) 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION 
2. Numerous component parts of the power plant failed 
and Mother Earth filed an action against Forsgren-Perkins in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
alleging various engineering design errors and failures of 
supervision during construction. (See Complaint of Mother 
Earth attached to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change 
of Venue or in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.) 
3. Mother Earth's complaint alleged hundreds of 
thousands of dollars worth of out-of-pocket losses to 
redesign and rebuild substantial portions of the power plant, 
together with lost profits and general damages. (See 
Complaint of Mother Earth attached to Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Change of Venue or in the Alternative to 
Dismiss, R. 15, in particular paragraph 24, et. sea.) 
4. Mother Earth maintained its business office in Salt 
Lake County, and Forsgren-Perkins maintained its place of 
business in Salt Lake County, and with fewp exceptions, all of 
the contemplated witnesses resided in and about Salt Lake 
County, Utah County, and Davis County, or would be flying to 
Utah and landing at the Salt Lake City Airport. (See Mother 
Earth Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue or 
6 
in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.) 
5. Forsgren-Perkins responded to the Mother Earth 
Complaint and filed an answer, counterclaim and third party 
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court. In that 
counterclaim and third party complaint: 
a. Forsgren-Perkins made claim against 
Mother Earth for $50,389.48, as the alleged 
remaining amount of fees due Forsgren-Perkins for 
its services rendered. 
b. Forsgren-Perkins made claim against 
Mother Earth for alleged RICE violations, 
racketeering, theft by deception, conspiracy, abuse 
of process, illicit dealings with parties, 
subornation of perjury, and scheme or artifice to 
defraud. 
c. Forsgren-Perkins made claim against 
Ormat, the supplier of the turbine generator 
systems for the power producing facility. 
d. Forsgren-Perkins made claim against AMFAC 
Plumbing Supply, the supplier of industrial valves. 
e. Forsgren-Perkins made claim against Jay 
Hauth an employee of Mother Earth. 
(See Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint attached 
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as an exhibit to Mother Earth's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, R. 15.) 
6. Mother Earth moved for Rule 11 sanctions for the 
reckless assertion of unfounded claims contained in the 
Forsgren-Perkins Counterclaim, and to Dismiss portions of the 
Counterclaim and/or for a More Definite Statement. (See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11, 
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative for a More Definite Statement attached to Mother 
Earth's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue 
or in the Alternative to Dismiss, R. 15.) 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION 
7. Forsgren-Perkins filed a separate complaint dated 
March 23, 1987, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and 
for Beaver County in which Forsgren-Perkins made demand for 
the same $50,389.48 described in its Counterclaim previously 
filed, but in addition it asked for foreclosure of the lien 
which it had filed in Beaver County. (See Complaint, and 
Lien, R. 1.) 
8. Since the facts and circumstances giving rise to 
the claims asserted in the action filed by Forsgren-Perkins 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court were identical to the 
facts and circumstances giving rise to the claims set forth 
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in Forsgren-Perkins' counterclaim, and since the amount 
demanded was identical, Mother Earth filed a Motion for 
Change of Venue or in the Alternative to Dismiss, or in the 
Alternative to Stay all Proceedings Pending the Outcome in a 
Case Filed Previously by Plaintiffs. (See Motion, R. 12.) 
9. That Motion was served upon counsel for Forsgren-
Perkins on April 27, 1987, was filed pursuant to Rule 2.8 of 
the Rules of Practice of the District Courts, and was 
accompanied by a supporting memorandum. (See Memorandum, R. 
15.) 
10. Forsgren-Perkins failed to respond to the Motion 
and failed to file a memorandum in opposition as required by 
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice. (See Index to Record on 
Appeal.) 
11. The Fifth Judicial District Court granted Mother 
Earth's Motion to Dismiss and notified Mother Earth's counsel 
to prepare the appropriate order. The Order was prepared and 
simultaneously mailed to counsel for Forsgren-Perkins and to 
the Fifth Judicial District Court. (See Order, R. 112.) 
12. The Fifth Judicial District Court signed the Order 
of Dismissal (R. 112) on June 2, 1987, the fifth day after it 
was served upon Forsgren-Perkins. 
13. Forsgren-Perkins filed "Plaintiff's Exception to 
9 
Order of Dismissal and Request for Hearing" (R. 110) , and a 
Notice of Hearing (R. 108) after the District Court had 
already ruled on the Motion. (See Minute Entry, R. 107.) 
14. The Exception to Order is not directed to the 
language of the Order, but instead is directed to the 
underlying merits of the court's ruling. (See R. 110.) 
15. The date set for the hearing was continued by 
Forsgren-Perkins. (See Notice of Continuance of Hearing, R. 
114.) 
16. Mother Earth filed a Motion for an award of 
attorney's fees and costs arising out of Forsgren-Perkins1 
failure to respond to the Memorandum and its subsequent 
attempts to get the Court to reconsider its ruling. (See 
Motion, R. 117.) 
17. Forsgren-Perkins then filed "Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Re: Order for Change of Venue or Dismissal Without 
Prejudice." (R. 119.) In the Memorandum, Forsgren-Perkins 
admits the filing of an identical claim in the Third Judicial 
District Court, but argues that the proper venue for the 
foreclosure is in Beaver County, and that foreclosure of the 
lien was not requested in the claim filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court. (See Memorandum, R. 119.) 
18. Forsgren-Perkins' Memorandum (Exhibit, R. 119) 
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mistakenly argues that the venue should not be transferred to 
Salt Lake County. However the Order of Dismissal did not 
transfer the venue to Salt Lake County. (See Order of 
Dismissal, R. 112.) 
19. Mother Earth filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Re: Order for Change of Venue (SIC) 
or Dismissal Without Prejudice. (R. 127.) Attached to the 
Memorandum is a copy of the Counterclaim filed by Ormat 
against Forsgren-Perkins in the Third Judicial District 
Court. The Ormat Counterclaim asserts total claims for 
damages of $1,350,000.00 against Forsgren-Perkins. (R. 127.) 
20. Forsgren-Perkins filed an additional Notice of 
Continuance of Hearing on Plaintiff's Exception to Order. 
(R. 165.) 
21. Forsgren-Perkins filed "Opposition to Defendants1 
Motion for Sanctions", dated July 8, 1987. (R. 167.) 
22. Forsgren-Perkins filed Plaintiff's Motion for 
Modification of Order, dated January 4, 1989. (R. 170.) The 
Motion was accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion dated January 4, 1989. (R. 179.) 
23. Mother Earth filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order. (R. 182.) 
24. Forsgren-Perkins filed a Reply Brief dated January 
11 
17, 1989, and a Request for Ruling dated January 24, 1989. 
(R. 191.) 
25. The District Court denied Forsgren-Perkins' Motion 
for Modification of Order and entered an "Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order" dated February 
21, 1989. (R. 195.) 
26. Forsgren-Perkins filed its Notice of Appeal dated 
March 14, 1989, by which it attempts to cippeal from both the 
original Order of Dismissal dated June 2, 1987, and from the 
"Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order" 
dated February , 1989. (R. 197.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1. FORSGREN-PERKINS FAILED TO FILE ITS NOTICE 
OF APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHIN THE 3 0 DAY 
PERIOD REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND 
THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED. 
The notice of appeal was not filed within 3 0 days of the 
entry of the Order of Dismissal. It was filed more than one 
year later. The failure to file in a timely manner 
constituted a jurisdictional defect and the appeal must be 
dismissed. 
POINT NO. 2. THE EXCEPTION TO THE ORDER AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FILED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS DID NOT EXTEND 
THE TIME FOR THE FILING OF AN APPEAL. 
Forsgren-Perkins filed an exception to the Order of 
Dismissal, but did not file a motion to amend the order until 
12 
more than one year later. Neither the exception to the order 
nor the motion to amend the order tolled the time for the 
filing of a timely notice of appeal. Forsgren-Perkins' 
actions did not toll the 30 day waiting period pursuant to 
either the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the case law so 
as to extend the time for the filing of an appeal. 
POINT NO. 3. FORSGREN-PERKINS APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF ORDER FAILS FOR THE 
REASON THAT AN APPEAL MAY NOT BE TAKEN FROM SUCH AN ORDER. 
Forsgren-Perkins filed an untimely motion for a 
modification of the Order of Dismissal. The motion was filed 
more than a year after the Order of Dismissal was entered. 
Under Utah case law, an appeal may not be taken from an 
untimely motion to modify an Order. 
POINT NO. 4. THE TRIAL COURT fS CONDUCT WAS GOVERNED BY 
RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE DISTRICT COURTS, AND 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS IN CONFORMITY THEREWITH. 
Forsgren-Perkins defaulted, and failed to respond to 
Mother Earth's motion to dismiss within the 10 days specified 
in Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts. 
Upon its failure to respond, the District Court ruled on and 
granted Mother's Earth's motion to dismiss. Such procedure 
was in conformity with the Rules of Practice of the District 
Courts. 
13 
POINT NO. 5. FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED ITS 
RIGHT TO A FORECLOSURE OF THE MECHANICS LIEN WHEN IT FILED 
ITS COUNTER-CLAIM. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
LACK JURISDICTION OVER THE LIEN FORECLOSURE. 
Forsgren-Perkins was a defendant in an action filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court. In that action, Forsgren-
Perkins filed a compulsory counterclaim in which it asserted 
its right to recover for alleged unpaid services rendered by 
Forsgren-Perkins. Forsgren-Perkins asserted its right to 
recover for the services, but it did not request a 
foreclosure of its mechanics lien, although it could have 
done so. The Utah State Statute regarding foreclosure of 
mechanics liens merely prescribes the venue for trial, which 
venue can be changed, but does not limit the jurisdiction of 
the courts to the county in which the mechanics lien is 
filed. 
POINT NO. 6. THE CASES CITED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS IN 
THEIR BRIEF ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CASE AT HAND, AND 
ARE NOT CONTROLLING LAW. 
Forsgren-Perkins cited a number of cases which were not 
applicable to the case at hand. Although Forsgren-Perkins 
attempted to draw analogies, they failed in light of specific 
case law which is directly on point. In addition, rather 
than dealing with controlling Utah case law, Forsgren-Perkins 
cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions. 
14 
POINT NO. 7. MOTHER EARTH DISAGREES WITH SEVERAL OF THE 
FACTUAL REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY FORSGREN-PERKINS IN ITS 
BRIEF. 
Mother Earth did not agree to any extensions of time 
within which to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, and Mother 
Earth did not agree to a change of venue. 
POINT NO. 8. FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HAD BEEN 
SIGNED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT. 
Although Forsgren-Perkins relies, to a great extent, 
upon its claim that it was unaware that the Order of 
Dismissal had been entered, the circumstances surrounding the 
service of the Order upon Forsgren-Perkins and subsequent 
notifications to Forsgren-Perkins were such as to either 
constitute notice the Order had been entered, or were such as 
to charge Forsgren-Perkins with a duty to inquire, or in 
other words constituted constructive notice the Order of 
Dismissal had been entered. 
15 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
FORSGREN-PERKINS FAILED TO FILE ITS 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITHIN THE 30 DAY PERIOD 
REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT AND THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED. 
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides 
in part as follows: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. 
"In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the district court to the 
Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from . . . 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a 
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in the district court by any 
party: (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under 
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of 
fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment 
would be required if the motion is granted; (3) 
under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of 
the order denying a new trial or granting or 
denying any other such motion. . . 
it 
• • • • 
The failure to file a Notice of Appeal within 30 days 
after the entry of a final order of dismissal is fatal and 
constitutes a jurisdictional defect. In Steiner v. State, 27 
Utah 2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972), the District Court granted 
a motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs did not file a motion to 
16 
alter or amend the order entered by the Court. The 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint which was 
expressly prohibited by the order of dismissal. The District 
Court granted a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The 
Utah Supreme Court held the time for filing a notice of 
appeal commenced to run from the date of the entry of the 
original order of dismissal, not the date of the subsequent 
order of dismissal of the amended complaint. 
In the case at hand, the Order of Dismissal was entered 
on June 2, 1987. The Notice of Appeal is dated March 14, 
1989, almost two years after the Order of Dismissal was 
entered. Forsgren-Perkins did not appeal from the Order of 
Dismissal within the 30 days required by Rule 4 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. The failure to file a timely 
appeal is jurisdictional and neither the Utah Supreme Court 
nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
from the Order of Dismissal entered June 2, 1987. 
Having failed to file the notice of appeal from the 
Order of Dismissal within the 30 days required, the appeal 
must be dismissed. 
17 
POINT NO. 2 
THE EXCEPTION TO THE ORDER AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FILED BY FORSGREN-
PERKINS DID NOT EXTEND THE TIME FOR THE 
FILING OF AN APPEAL. 
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides 
for an extension of the time to file an appeal. Forsgren-
Perkins1 reliance upon Rule 50(b), Rule 52 and/or Rule 59 
URCP is not well taken. Rule 50(b) URCP pertains to a motion 
for a directed verdict and is not applicable to the case at 
hand. Rule 52 URCP pertains to "Findings" made by a trial 
court and is not applicable. Rule 52(b) URCP provides as 
follows: 
"(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made 
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. 
The motion may be made with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact 
are made in actions tried by the court without a 
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be 
raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an 
objection to such findings or has made either a 
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial." 
It is difficult to see how Rule 52(b) URCP could apply 
to the case at hand. Forsgren-Perkins did not make a motion 
for a new trial, or a motion to amend the judgment within 10 
days after the entry of the judgment, and no findings of fact 
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were involved• Rule 59 URCP pertains to New Trials. Even if 
Forsgren-Perkins could claim the right to attack an Order of 
Dismissal by filing a motion for a new trial, it must be 
filed within 10 days after the entry of the judgment, which 
did not occur in the case at hand. Although Forsgren-Perkins 
refers to Rule 60 URCP, it did not make a Rule 60 Motion. 
A motion for reconsideration does not extend the time 
for filing an appeal. See Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 
495 P.2d 809 (1972) 
In Peay v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court observed: 
". . . It is important to note in this regard 
that a party cannot extend the time for filing an 
appeal simply by filing a "Motion for 
Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and 
Motion for Relief from Final Judgment." As this 
Court held in Utah State Employees Credit Union v. 
Riding, 
We think the motion to reconsider 
the motion to vacate the judgment is 
abortive under the rules . . .." 
The reasoning behind such a ruling was 
articulated in Drury v. Lunceford where the Court 
ruled as follows: 
When [a motion has been made] and 
the court has ruled upon the motion, if 
the party ruled against were permitted to 
go beyond the rules, make a motion for 
reconsideration, and persuade the judge 
to reverse himself, the question arises, 
why should not the other party who is now 
ruled against be permitted to make a 
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motion for re-re-consideration, asking 
the court to again reverse himself?" 
(Id. at 843 0 
In Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982) , 
the Supreme Court held that an untimely motion for a new 
trial "had no effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal." 
Forsgren-Perkins' brief on appeal cites several cases on 
which it relies for its claim that the time for appeal was 
tolled. In Pruitt v. Taylor, 247 N.C. 380, 100 S.E.2d 841 
(1957), the court had awarded a default judgment in excess of 
the amount prayed for in the complaint after Plaintiff 
amended the complaint to conform to the proof of damages* 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a judgment 
rendered in excess of the amount prayed for in the complaint, 
without notice to the defaulting party was invalid. 
In State v. McMullen, 764 P.2d 634 (Utah Pp. 1988) cited 
by Forsgren-Perkins, the Court of Appeals appears to hold 
that serving notice of the order under Rule 2.9 was 
sufficient, and would not even be required in a criminal 
case. Forsgren-Perkins mistakenly claims that McMullen 
considers a "Request to Reconsider" as a motion for a new 
trial. To the contrary, McMullen appears to hold directly 
against Forsgren-Perkins position and holds that failure to 
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file the notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of the 
original order of denial of a motion for a new trial was 
fatal. It further holds, the filing of a notice of appeal 
from a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for a 
new trial was improper, the denial of the motion to 
reconsider not being an appealable judgment. Although 
McMullen is a criminal matter, the theory is directly on 
point and holds directly against the position of Forsgren-
Perkins. 
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 
42 (Utah App. 1988), the Court of Appeals did indicate that, 
by implication, Rule 54(b) URCP does allow for the 
possibility of a trial judge to change his or her mind during 
the course of litigation where an order has been made 
involving multiple parties or multiple ongoing claims. 
However, in the case at hand, the issue was simple, there was 
no continuing litigation and James Constructors does not 
appear to have any application. 
Forsgren-Perkins» cites Moon Lake Elec. v. Ultra Systems 
W. Const., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988). While it is true 
that Moon Lake held that a motion for new trial filed after a 
motion for summary judgment tolled the time for appeal, 
Forsgren-Perkins did not file a motion for a new trial. 
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Forsgren-Perkins merely filed an exception to the order, and 
more than one year later filed the "Motion for Modification 
of Order". (R. 170.) 
The time to file the appeal was not extended by virtue 
of any of Forsgren-Perkins1 Motions, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure cited by Forsgren-Perkins, or by any of the case 
law relied upon in Forsgren-Perkins1 brief on appeal. 
POINT NO. 3 
FORSGREN-PERKINS APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL 
OF PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
ORDER FAILS FOR THE REASON THAT AN APPEAL 
MAY NOT BE TAKEN FROM SUCH AN ORDER. 
The Notice of Appeal indicates it is also an appeal from 
the "denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order." 
Forsgren-Perkins1 Motion for Modification of Order is a 
motion for reconsideration in which Forsgren-Perkins asks the 
Court to reverse the Order of Dismissal. The Motion for 
Modification of Order does not extend the time for the filing 
of an appeal from the Order of Dismissal entered June 1, 
1987, and is not an order from which an appeal may be made. 
(See Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), and Habbeshaw v. 
Habbeshaw, 17 Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 (1966.) In 
Habbeshaw, the Utah Supreme Court held that an appeal from an 
order denying a motion for a new trial was abortive. 
Equity does not support Forsgren-Perkins attempts to 
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reverse the ruling of the lower Court. Since the date of the 
Order of Dismissal and the subsequent expiration of the 
mechanic's lien, the electrical power generating plant has 
been sold to the City of Provo and should the lien be 
reinstated, it would impact upon property now owned by the 
City of Provo. The same claims of Forsgren-Perkins are still 
pending in the Counterclaim filed by Forsgren-Perkins in the 
Third Judicial District Court. Forsgren-Perkins has not and 
will not be denied access to the Court to litigate its claim 
for services rendered. Forsgren-Perkins will merely be 
without an enforceable mechanics lien. The loss of the lien 
rights, if any, in Beaver County is inconsequential given the 
nature of the proceedings in the Third Judicial District 
Court. 
POINT NO. 4 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDUCT WAS GOVERNED BY 
RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE 
DISTRICT COURTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS IN CONFORMITY THEREWITH. 
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court, 
provided as follows: 
"(a) All motions, except uncontested or ex 
parte matters, shall be accompanied by a brief 
statement of points and authorities and any 
affidavits relied upon in support thereof. . . 
(b) The responding party shall file and serve 
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upon all parties within ten (10) days after service 
of the motion, a statement of answering points and 
authorities and counter-affidavits. 
(c) The moving party may serve and file reply 
points and authorities within five (5) days after 
service of responding party's points and 
authorities. Upon the expiration of such five (5) 
day period to file reply points and authorities, 
either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter for decision. 
(f) Decision shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless requested by the court, in which 
event the clerk shall set a date and time for such 
hearing. 
ii 
. . . 
Although the rule was subsequently superceded by the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, effective October 30, 
1988, it was the controlling rule at the time of the 
dismissal of the above-entitled action. 
Mother Earth's Motion to Dismiss supported by memorandum 
was uncontested. Although Forsgren-Perkins was obligated by 
Rule 2.8 to file a responsive memorandum within 10 days, it 
failed to respond and pursuant to Rule 2.8, the District 
Court granted Mother Earth's Motion to Dismiss. 
Forsgren-Perkins Memorandum does not address the fact 
that it failed to file a responsive memorandum with the lower 
court as required by Rule 2.8. Instead, it concentrates its 
attention on the fact that the Order entered by the Court was 
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signed on the fifth day, a technical rather than a 
substantive defect, 
POINT NO. 5 
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED ITS 
RIGHT TO A FORECLOSURE OF THE MECHANICS 
LIEN WHEN IT FILED ITS COUNTER-CLAIM. 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
LACK JURISDICTION OVER THE LIEN 
FORECLOSURE. 
Rule 13 URCP provides in part as follows: 
"(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading 
shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at 
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has 
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not 
require for its adjudication the presence of third 
parties of whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the 
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced 
the claim was the subject of another pending action 
ii 
. . . 
In the case at hand, Forsgren-Perkins filed a 
counterclaim and made claim for services rendered arising out 
of the design and construction of the power plant. It was 
the same transaction or occurrence for which Mother Earth was 
claiming damages arising out of negligent design and 
negligent construction supervision. 
The counterclaim was clearly compulsory. At the same 
time the counterclaim was filed, Forsgren-Perkins could have 
requested a foreclosure of its lien filed in Beaver County. 
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At issue was the question of venue, not jurisdiction. The 
Utah Code Ann. provided as follows: 
"Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-13-1. Actions 
respecting real property. 
Actions for the following causes must be tried 
in the county in which the subject of the action, 
or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the 
power of the court to change the place of trial as 
provided in this code: 
. . . . 
(3) For the foreclosure of all 
liens and mortgages on real property. 
it 
. . . . 
Forsgren-Perkins could have included the claim for 
foreclosure of the mechanics lien in its counterclaim filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court. The Third Judicial 
District Court did not lack jurisdiction over the claim. 
POINT NO. 6 
THE CASES CITED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS IN 
THEIR BRIEF ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE 
CASE AT HAND, AND ARE NOT CONTROLLING 
LAW. 
In Smith v. Fulyater, 47 Ill.App.3d 662, 365 N.E.2d 92 
(1977) , cited by Forsgren-Perkins, the action was put on the 
military calendar, then without notice to Plaintiff's 
counsel, the following actions occurred: (1) the case was 
assigned; (2) the case was removed from the military 
calendar; (3) a pretrial conference was scheduled; and (4) 
26 
the action was dismissed for failure of Plaintiff's counsel 
to attend the pretrial conference. Since there had been no 
warning or notice to Plaintiff's counsel of any of the 
foregoing actions, the appellate court held that the 
dismissal should be vacated. 
In Laidler v. National Bank of Detroit. 133 Mich.App. 
85, 348 N.W.2d 42 (1984), the court had neglected to notify 
Plaintiff's counsel that the case had been placed on the no 
progress docket, so the computer generated dismissal which 
automatically followed was set aside. 
The following case cited by Plaintiff does not support 
Plaintiff's claim. In Rhiner v. Arends, 292 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 
1980) , a court notice to try or dismiss the case was sent, 
the parties stipulated to a continuance, but the case was not 
tried on the date of continuance and no further continuance 
was filed. The Iowa court held a second notice was not 
necessary and the dismissal entered by the court could not be 
set aside. 
In McKinley v. Town of Fredonia. 140 Ariz. 189, 680 P.2d 
1250 (1984), a letter was drafted to plaintiff's counsel 
putting the case on the inactive calendar, which meant that a 
dismissal would be entered if a certificate of readiness was 
not filed within two months. The presumption that the notice 
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was received by plaintiff's deceased counsel was overcome by 
an affidavit by the secretary that the notice was never 
received. The appellate court determined that, 
"The affidavit was uncontroverted, 
uncontradicted, unimpeached, and therefore must be 
accepted as true..." 
(Id. at 1253.) Since the Defendant could not overcome the 
affidavit, the dismissal, based upon a failure to prosecute 
after notice, was set aside by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 
A review of the foregoing cases demonstrates that they 
are neither controlling law, nor are they applicable to the 
facts of the case at hand. 
POINT NO. 7 
MOTHER EARTH DISAGREES WITH SEVERAL OF 
THE FACTUAL REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY 
FORSGREN-PERKINS IN ITS BRIEF. 
In the Forsgren-Perkins brief, a number of factual 
representations are made which are not supported by the 
record. In addition to being unsubstantiated, they appear to 
be highly prejudicial in favor of Forsgren-Perkins, and in 
several instances are found in the Statement of Issues 
Presented for Appeal and Statement of the Case. A brief 
summary of Mother Earth's disagreement with Forsgren-Perkins1 
statement of facts is as follows: 
1. At no time did Mother Earth ever enter into a 
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Stipulation with Forsgren-Perkins for a continuance of the 
original Motion to Dismiss. 
2. At no time did Forsgren-Perkins either request an 
extension of time to respond to the Motion, or receive a 
Stipulation that it had additional time within which to 
respond. 
Forsgren-Perkins1 suggestion in its Brief of Appellant 
that such was the case is not supported by the record, and is 
expressly denied by Mother Earth. 
POINT NO. 8 
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THAT THE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL HAD BEEN SIGNED AND ENTERED BY 
THE COURT. 
Forsgren-Perkins claims to lack any knowledge that the 
Order of Dismissal had been signed and entered by the Court. 
Forsgren-Perkins was on notice the Order had been sent to the 
Court for signature, but made no effort to discover whether 
it had been signed and entered. 
Forsgren-Perkins1 Memorandum in Re: Order for Change of 
Venue or Dismissal Without Prejudice dated June 24, 1987 (R. 
119) gives the appearance of knowledge of the entry of the 
Order of Dismissal. It says Forsgren-Perkins "takes 
exception to the Order of the Court which dismisses the 
Complaint without Prejudice." The Memorandum does not use 
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the word ruling, but distinctly refers to "Order". In Mother 
Earth's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Memorandum 
(R. 127), Mother Earth clearly stated in para. 1 that the 
"Court entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint 
without prejudice." Mother Earth gave additional notice the 
Order was entered on page 7 of the Memorandum (R. 127) 
wherein Mother Earth stated: 
"There is no provision in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for a party to take an exception to 
an Order entered by a Court. . ." 
In light of all the circumstances, Forsgren-Perkins 
should be charged with constructive notice the Order had been 
entered, or, at the least, Forsgren-Perkins had an obligation 
to investigate the status of the Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the Utah Supreme Court dismiss 
the appeal, or in the alternative affirm the Order of 
Dismissal entered by the lower Court. 
Dated this day of September, 1989. 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondents to the following this day 
of September, 1989. 
Earl S. Spafford 
L. Charles Spafford 
Spafford & Spafford 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
PLACE OF TRIAL—VENUE 78-13-1 
78-13-1. Actions respecting real property. 
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the 
subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of 
the court to change the place of trial as provided in this code: 
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, 
or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for 
injuries to real property. 
(2) For the partition of real property. 
(3) For the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real property. 
Where the real property is situated partly in one county and partly in 
another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county so 
selected is the proper county for the trial of such action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Defense of improper 
Supp., 104-13-1. venue, U R.C.P. 12(b), (d). 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal re-
quired by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party (1) for 
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed m the district court by any party 
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial, or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after 
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entr\ of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal withm 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or withm the time otherwise 
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district 
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expira-
tion of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties m accordance 
with the district court rules of practice No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion, wnichever occurs later 
Rule 13, Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against 
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adju-
dication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action 
was commenced the claim was th$ subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by 
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on 
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or 
may not dimmish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party It may 
claim rehef exceeding m amount or different m kind from that sought m the 
pleading of the opposing party 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which 
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supple-
mental pleading 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
40 
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(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim 
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of 
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party 
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties 
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete 
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall 
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if juris-
diction of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may 
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of 
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross 
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one 
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set 
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each 
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or 
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to 
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an as-
signor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted 
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or 
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to 
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
action and certify the same and transmit all papers therein to the district 
court of the county in which such inferior court is maintained, upon the pay-
ment by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of 
the fees required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and for 
docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein required to be paid, 
shall be deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the time of filing such 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court 
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim. 
In any action so certified to the district court, when any responsive pleading 
is required or permitted or a motion is allowed under these rules, the time in 
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be made shall commence to 
run from the time notice of the filing of the cause in the district court shall be 
served on the party making such responsive pleading or motion. 
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iule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
or a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
)ffer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
"eserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
Deen made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall spec-
ify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
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nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted. 
OR 
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Rule 52, Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial m an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jurv or adverse party 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law 
(7) Error m law 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
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Rule 60- Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed m the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or hi- legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons. (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
withm a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in tl ^e 
rules or by an independent action. 
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Rule 2.8. Motions. 
(a) All motions, except uncontested or ex parte matters, shall be accompa-
nied by a brief statement of points and authorities and any affidavits relied 
upon in support thereof Points and authorities supporting or opposing a mo-
tion for summary judgment shall not exceed five <5) pages in length exclusive 
of the 'statement of material facts' as hereinafter provided 
lb) The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten 
110) days after service of the motion, a statement of answering points and 
authorities and counter-affidavits 
<c) The moving partv mav serve and file reply points and authorities within 
five (5) days after service of responding party's points and authorities Upon 
the expiration of such five <"5) day period to file reply points and authorities, 
either party may notify the clerk to submit the matter for decision. 
<d) The points and authorities m support of a motion for summary judg-
ment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particularity to 
those portions of the record upon which movant relies 
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judg-
ment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which the paity contends a genuine issue exists Each fact in 
dispute shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with 
particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed All material facts set forth in the statement 
of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing partv 
(0 Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by the 
court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such hearing 
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting the 
motion may request a hearing and such request shall be granted unless the 
motion is summarily denied If no such request is made within ten (10) davs ot 
notice to submit for decision, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived 
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and anv circuit court bv older 
of the judge or judges of the court mav exclude that court trom the operation of 
this Rule 2 8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be prescribed bv 
written administrative order or rule 
Rule 2.9. Written orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for ti e party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen (15) davs or within shorter time is the court mav 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity 
with the ruling 
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and/or otders shall be served 
on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to 
the court and counsel within (5) days after service 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing and 
presented to the court for signature within fifteen 115) davs of the settlement 
and dismissal 
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DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Utah Corporation 
Defendants 
INDEX TO RECORD ON APPEAL 
CIVIL NO. 87-010 
SUPREME COURT NO. 890099 
Title of Instruments 
Complaint 
Summons (20 Day) 
Summons (20 Day) 
Motion for Change of Venue or in the Alternative to 
Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Stay All 
Proceedings Pending the Outcome in a Case Filed 
Previously by Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue or 
in the Alternative to Dismiss, or in the Alternative 
to Stay all proceedings Pending the Outcome in a 
Case Filed Previously by Plaintiffs 
Minute Entry Dated May 18, 1987 
Notice of Hearing 
Plaintiff's Exception to Order of Dismissal and 
Request for Hearing 
Order of Dismissal 
Notice of Continuance of Hearing 
Motion 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Re: Order for Change of Venue 
or Dismissal Without Prejudice 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Re: Order for Change of Venue (SIC) 
or Dismissal without Prejudice 
Notice of Continuance of Hearing 
Apposition to Defendants' Motion for Sanctions 
Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Order 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Modify 
Order Dismissing Complaint Without Prejudice 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Modification of Order 
Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Modification of Order 
Request for Ruling 
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Ordei 
Notice of Appeal 
Proof of Service 
Notice of Appeal Filed 
Record Page Number 
1 
6 
9 
12 
15 
107 
108 
110 
112 
114 
117 
119 
127 
165 
167 
170 
179 
182 
191 
194 
195 
197 
198 
199 
PVH1R1T PYH1R1T A 
Jack L. Schoenhals #2881 
Attorney at Law 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. 538-2344 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
F0R3GREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, 
p.a., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, a 
Delaware Corporation, and 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d matter came on regularly for hearing 
b e f o r e the H o n o r a b l e J. Phil i p E v e s , pursuant to Defendant 
M o t h e r Earth I n d u s t r i e s M o t i o n to Dismiss the Complaint of 
the P l a i n t i f f , the matter being heard on the first regularly 
s c h e d u l e d Law and M o t i o n date f o l l o w i n g the filing of the 
Mo t i o n and M e m o r a n d u m of M o t h e r Earth Industries, Inc., no 
one a p p e a r i n g at the hearing, the Court having reviewed the 
f i l e s a n d r e c o r d s in t h i s c a s e , and the M o t i o n and 
M e m o r a n d u m of M o t h e r Earth Industries, Inc., and good cause 
appearing therefore: 
UKuuK \jr UliWi5i.-,L 
Civil No. 87-010 
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I T IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t the 
D e f e n d a n t Mother E a r t h I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . ' s Motion to Dismiss 
t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint be, and the same is hereby granted 
w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e . 
Dated t h i s Hay of^M^r, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
J . RAIL IP EVES, JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I mai led a copy of the f o r e g o i n g 
Order to E a r l S. S p a f f o r d , L. C h a r l e s S p a f f o r d , 311 South 
S t a t e , S u i t e 3 8 0 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 , t h i s ^%"~~ day 
of May, 1987 . 
r^\ 
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EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051) |E. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
SSPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
[A Professional Corporation 
Qll South State Street, #380 
•Bait Lake City, Utah 34111 
1(801) 531-8020 
'Attorneys for Plaintiff, Forsgren-Perkins Engineering 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * 
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, : 
p.a., An Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTION TO ORDER 
/S. : OF DISMISSAL AND REQUEST 
: FOR HEARING 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC.,: 
a Delaware Corporation, and : 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Jtah Corporation, : 
Defendants. : Civil No. 87-010 
* * * * 
COMES NOW the plaintiff by and through the undersigned 
Counsel to respectfully take exception to the Proposed Order of 
Dismissal herein and to Move the Court for an opportunity to 
address the matter by oral argument, to allow the matter to be 
Jfully and fairly addressed on the merits and to provide the Court 
With a balanced presentation herein. 
DATED this ^ ? day of May, 1987. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
Earl 
L. Charles Spafford 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Forsgren-Perkins Engineering 
J.0 
EARL S. SPAFFORD (3051) 
L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
JOHN A. DONAHUE (4975) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FORSGREN-PERKINS, I 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, MODIFICATION OF ORDER 
vs . 
Civil No. C87-010 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES 
Judge J. Phillips Eves 
Defendant. | 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff to move the above entitled court 
for a ruling on plaintiff's objection to order of dismissal and 
for an Order modifying the dismissal to allow transfer of these 
proceedings in consolidation with the pending Salt Lake County 
action herein. This Motion is based upon the following grounds: 
•1. On April 27,1987, defendant filed a Motion for a 
change of Venue or in the alternative to dismiss. 
2. The matter was scheduled for hearing and continued 
on at least two occasions by both counsel. 
3. On May 18, 19 87, a Minute Order was entered 
1 
i a 
dismissing the case without prejudice. Neither counsel were 
notified nor present. 
4. On May 28, 19 87, a proposed order dismissing the 
case was filed and mailed to plaintiff. A true and correct copy 
of said document is attached hereto and incorporated herein as 
Exhibit A. 
5. On May 29, 1987, in conformance with Local Rule of 
Practice 2.9(b), plaintiff objected to the proposed order. A 
true and correct copy of said document is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein as Exhibit B. 
6. The Objection and Memoranda apparently crossed in 
the mail and, on June 2, 19 87 the court entered an Order 
dismissing the complaint without prejudice. 
7. At no time, until December 6, 1988, has plaintiff's 
counsel received notice that the Order of Dismissal had been 
signed. Notice was first received when plaintiff's attorney 
directed his assistant to contact Mr. Schoenhals concerning a 
previous oral agreement that the Beaver County action could be 
refiled and consolidated with the Salt Lake County action. 
During this conversation, Mr. Schoenhals indicated that the 
Beaver County action had been dismissed. 
8. We submit that because of the one year statute of 
limitations concerning the filing of Mechanic's lien foreclosure 
actions, and due to plaintiff's reasonable belief that the 
objection to the order of dismissal was pending, and that the 
2 
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matter would simply be moved to Salt Lake by stipulation, 
plaintiff took no action. Plaintiff was by no means lax or 
careless in its attention to the matter, for plaintiff scheduled 
two hearings on its exception to the proposed order, and both 
were continued at the request of defendant. 
9. We submit that in the light of the foregoing 
circumstances, it is appropriate for the court to modify its 
earlier Order dismissing the case, to instead provide for a 
change of Venue to the Salt Lake County jurisdiction. 
10. This modification will not substantially harm any 
party, as the related case in the Third District is ongoing, and 
will be for some time. 
DATED this ^/-^ day of- ,4 . c. a > , 1989. 
/ 
/ 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
f2> 
L. Charles Spafford 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
forsg.mod l/3/891kj 
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J, _^_ 
L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
CHASE KIMBALL (4993) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East 100 South' 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, 
] NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, and 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C87-010 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF and hereby gives all interested 
parties notice of its intent to appeal the ruling of the above-
court dismissing the case as well as the denial of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Modification of Order. Said appeal is pursuant to 
URCP 73 and RUSC 3 and 4. This appeal is to the Utah Supreme 
Court in accordance with UCA §78-2-2(3)(i). 
DATED this jf (_ day of March, 1989. 
Spafford & Spafford, P.C. 
Chase Kimball 
Attorney for Defendant 
EXHIBIT G 
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